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BlAck G l R esistance  D urinq  t Me V ietnam  
W ar
DAvid CoRTRiqhT
One of the least known but most important chapters in the 
history of America’s encounter with Vietnam was the internal rebellion 
that wracked the U.S. military. From the Long Binh jail in Vietnam, to 
Travis Air Force Base in California, to aircraft carriers in the South China 
Sea, the armed forces faced widespread resistance and unrest. 
Throughout the military morale and discipline sank to record lows. 
Antiwar committee and underground newspapers appeared everywhere.1 
Unauthorized absence rates reached unprecedented levels: in the Army 
in 1971 there were seventeen AWOLs and seven desertions for every one 
hundred soldiers.2 Harsher forms of rebellion also occurred—drug 
abuse, violent uprisings, refusal of orders, even attacks against superiors. 
The cumulative result of this resistance within the ranks was a severe 
breakdown in military effectiveness and combat capability. By 1969 the 
Army had ceased to function as an effective fighting force and was rapidly 
disintegrating. The armed forces had to be withdrawn from Indochina 
for their very survival.
The strongest and most militant resisters were black GIs. Of all 
the soldiers of the Vietnam era, black and other minority GIs were 
consistently the most active in their opposition to the war and military 
injustice. Blacks faced greater oppression that whites, and they fought 
back with greater detennination and anger. The rebellions that shook 
American cities like Watts, Newark, and Detroit erupted at major 
military installationsjust a few years later. The result was a military tom 
by racial rebellion.
The militancy of black GIs was a reaction to the pervasiveness of 
racial discrimination within the military. Racism has always existed in 
the American military as it has in the larger civilian society. In some 
respects the milit ary is better than civilian life: in 1948, the anned forces 
were desegregated before many civilian agencies, and military sendee is 
one of the few avenues of potential advancement available for blacks. In 
other respects, though, the military is worse: the arbitrary nature of 
command authority can mean a miserable existence for those who seme 
under prejudiced commanders. Studies conducted during the Vietnam 
era confinn that institutionalized discrimination was widespread, 
especially in the military justice system. One of the most thorough 
studies was the Department of defense’s own four-volume Report o f the 
Task Force on the Administration o f Military Justice, issued in December
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1972. According to the Pentagon report, “No command or installation... 
is entirely free from the effects of systematic discrimination against 
minority servicemen.”3 The Congressional Black Caucus also conducted 
a study of discrimination within the military in 1972 and came up with 
similar findings. The Caucus’ report concluded that “racism has 
become institutionalized at all levels of the military.”4
Job assignment is a primary concern for black GIs, and the 
Pentagon and Black Caucus reports confirmed what the soldiers already 
knew: they were disproportionately assigned to low-skill and dead-end 
positions, especially in combat and service jobs. In 1971, according to 
the Black Caucus study, black servicemen represented 12.1 percent of 
all enlisted people, but they constituted 16.3 percent of those in combat, 
and 19.6 percent of those in service and supply positions.5 By contrast 
they held only 4.9 percent of jobs in electronics specialties. In an Army 
study of dissenters in 1971, 31% of blacks interviewed were assigned to 
combat, compared to only 18% of the whites.6 Blacks were also 
discriminated against in military promotions. Blacks were 
disproportionately assigned to the lowest ranks and were 
underrepresented at the highest grades. This pattern was most 
pronounced in the Officer Corps. In 1974, blacks constituted 16 percent 
of all military personnel, but only 2.8 percent of officers.7
The system of military justice is notoriously discriminatory. The 
Department of Defense Task Force found that “a greater number of black 
enlisted men received non-judicial punishment [25 percent] than their 
proportionate number [12 percent].”8 Likewise in General and Special 
courts-martial studied by the Task Force, 23.4 percent of blacks and 
only 16.9 percent of whites received a punitive discharge as part of their 
sentence.9 The incidence of less-than-honorable discharges shows the 
same pattern. In 1971 less-than-honorable discharges were issued to 
one of every seven black GIs, compared to only one of every fourteen 
whites.10 Blacks were twice as likely as whites to receive a bad discharge.
While the struggle against racism and injustice was a major 
concern for black GIs, they, like most other soldiers, were also motivated 
by opposition to the war. The Army study of dissenters noted above 
confirms that ending the war was the number one priority for the 
majority of GI resisters. When asked to give the reason for their 
participation in dissent activities, the soldiers interviewed cited the 
"Vietnam War" 58 percent of the time. The other major reason, “The Way 
the Army Treats the Individual,” was cited 38 percent of the time.11 For 
black and other minority GIs, opposition to the war had a special 
meaning. Many blacks asked why they should risk death to defend 
freedom in Vietnam when they were denied basic rights back home. Why 
should they fight Asians in a distant land when they could be struggling 
against discrimination and racism in their own society? Such critical 
thinking received encouragement from the example of Cassius Clay 
[Muhammed Ali] and other draft resisters, and the antiwar speeches of 
Martin Luther King. Jr. A  popular documentary movie of the time was
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titled No Vietnamese Ever Called Me Nigger. The teachings of Malcolm 
X and his radical critique of the war also had influence at several major 
bases. Andrew Pulley, a leader of GIs United Against the War at Fort 
Jackson, South Carolina, reports that he and other soldiers were 
initiated into the GI movement by listening to tapes of Malcolm X in the 
barracks.12
For black GIs, opposition to military authority was often expressed 
in cultural symbols. Throughout the military blacks gathered in 
informal study groups and cultural clubs to listen to music, to study and 
rap together, and to promote black pride and consciousness. Many of 
these groups became centers of resistance activity as the connections 
between the war and racism spurred growing numbers of GIs into action. 
Often they would join together in collective defiance of the military. I 
remember from my own experience at Fort Bliss, Texas, for example, that 
“the brothers” roomed together in the same part of the barracks and 
engaged in behavior that blatantly challenged regulations. Many of the 
troops had huge Afro haircuts that far exceeded allowable standards. A 
group of ten or more of the brothers adorned with beads or African 
jewelry would strut conspicuously across the quad between the barracks 
carrying “power sticks” (African walking sticks with a carved fist at the 
top). Their Army caps perched atop oversized Afros, many wearing 
sneakers rather than combat boots, most with their shirts unbloused 
and unbuttoned, they were an affront to the military dress code. But the 
brothers were left alone. The company sergeants and commanders 
already had more than enough trouble dealing with the current level of 
dissent , and they did not want to cause more trouble by challenging the 
blacks.
One controversial cultural expression of the time was the “dap” 
or “power greeting”—an elaborate series of hand slapping and finger 
popping that could sometimes take a minute or more to perform.13 An 
innocuous enough greeting by itself, it sometimes became the center of 
conflict when prejudiced commanders or NCOs took offense and issued 
instructions banning it. In response, some blacks would develop an even 
more elaborate and time-consuming form of the dap, which they 
invariably chose to perform in mess hall lines, where it would cause the 
greatest disruption. Such manifestations of solidarity occurred frequently 
throughout the military and were an important assertion of social 
identity for black GIs.
To bet ter appreciate the extent of the GI resistance movement, let 
us consult again the Army study of dissent. Conducted in 1970 and 
1971 by the Research Analysis Corporation, a Virginia-based think tank 
that frequently served Army needs, the two volume report depicts a GI 
movement even more widespread than those of us involved at the time 
thought possible. The Army’s researchers interviewed hundreds of 
soldiers at major Army bases in the continental United States to 
determine the extent of participation in resistance activities and GI 
attitudes toward the military. The survey found that one out of every four
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enlisted soldiers had participated in “dissident” activities, defined as 
attendance at a coffee house, publication of a GI newspaper, participation 
in a demonstration, etc. The study found that an equal percentage of 
soldiers engaged in acts of “disobedience,” which was defined as 
insubordination, refusing orders, sabotaging equipment, etc. This 
dist inction between dissent and disobedience is helpful for understanding 
the full range of GI resistance activities. By combining these two 
categories of opposition, the Research Analysis Corporation found that 
a startling 47 percent of the soldiers interviewed engaged in some form 
of dissent or disobedience, with 32 percent involved in such activities 
more than once. If frequent drug use is added as another form of 
resistance, the combined percentage of soldiers involved in rebellious 
behavior comes to an incredible 55 percent. The Army’s own study thus 
shows that half of its soldiers during the 1970-1971 period were engaged 
in resistance activity—a truly astounding level of disaffection within the 
ranks.14
The development of the GI movement followed the evolution of 
the war itself. Soldier resistance appeared first in the Army and Marine 
Corps, which bore the brunt of the fighting in the early years of the war. 
As the Army and Marine Corps were withdrawn and the burden of 
continuing the war fell to the Navy and Air Force, the GI movement took 
hold in these services, and by 1970 the locus of revolt had shifted more 
to the Navy and Air Force.
During the first phase of the GI movement, black Marines and 
soldiers staged numerous rebellions at stateside bases. These were 
usually prison uprisings sparked by mistreatment and oppressive 
conditions. At Fort Bragg, on July 23, 1968, black and white GIs seized 
control of the stockade to protest the beating of a black inmate. The 
rebels held the stockade for forty-eight hours before surrendering to 
armed troops from the 82nd Airborne.15 Similar rebellions occurred at 
several Army bases in 1969—on May 13 at Fort Carson, on June 5 at Fort 
Dix, and on three separate occasions at Fort Riley. Nonviolent protests 
and boycotts were also led by blacks that year at Fort Ord and Fort 
Jackson.
Major rebellions also occurred in the Marine Corps. The oppressive 
brig at Camp Pendleton, California— described in an influential article as 
“Andersonville by the Sea”—was the site of several violent incidents.16 
After a series of protests during 1969, the prison exploded in bitterness 
and frustration. On the night of September 14, hundreds of prisoners 
broke out of their barracks, setting fires and smashing nearly everything 
in sight. When the rebellion was finally suppressed by tear gas-firing 
Military Police (MPs), the entire prison was a shambles.17 An even more 
severe and tragic uprising occurred on July 20, 1969, at Camp Lejeune. 
A dispute over a racial incident at an enlisted men’s club turned into a 
huge brawl that spread over the 1st Battalion, 6th Marines barracks 
area. The fighting left fourteen injured and one Marine dead.18
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GI resistance was even more widespread among the more than 
200,000 American soldiers stationed in West Germany. Black GIs 
organized study groups and rap clubs at nearly every major U.S. base in 
Germany. Among the more active groups were Unsatisfied Black 
Soldiers from the Mannheim-Heidelberg area, the Black Action Group in 
the Stuttgart region, and the Black Dissent Group from Smiley barracks 
at Karlsruhe. In 1970 these groups joined together at a remarkable “Call 
for Justice” assembly at the University of Heidelberg. Nearly 1,000 active 
duty soldiers, most of them black, gathered on July 4 to issue their own 
declaration of independence, demanding an end to the war, a withdrawal 
of U.S. interests from southern Africa, the elimination of discriminatory 
practices in military justice and a guarantee to equal opportunity for 
black and other minority GIs.19
While black and white GI groups often worked in isolation from 
one another, black-white unity sometimes emerged with potent effect. 
An example occurred at Nellingen, West Germany, in the summer and 
fall of 1970. The arrival of a zealous new commander and an increase 
in complaints about harassment and racial discrimination created a 
virtual war within the base. A  Molotov cocktail was exploded outside the 
company orderly room, several fire bombings occurred on the base, and 
there were increasing incidents of sabotage. As the harassment of the 
troops and the number of racial incidents increased, the soldiers 
threatened to blow up the base. On the evening of September 21, 
approximately one hundred black and white GIs broke a curfew and 
marched through the base shouting “Revolution!” and “Join us!” to fellow 
GIs. The men returned to their barracks, but only after the Provost 
Marshal pledged that no reprisals would be carried out. Similar acts of 
defiance occurred at numerous bases, notjust in Germany but throughout 
the military.20
The cumulative result of this mounting wave of resistance was a 
severe crisis for U.S. ground forces. Already reeling from the heavy 
combat losses and huge manpower commitments of the Vietnam war, 
the Army faced a “terrible nightmare,” in the words of author Shelby 
Stanton.21 Practically every unit in the Army had been stripped of 
manpower for Vietnam and faced severe internal turmoil. Stanton 
writes:
By that year [1968] in Europe only 39 percent of the 465 
reporting units had a personnel readiness equal to their 
deliberately diminished assigned capability.... Even more chilling 
was the secret December 31,1968 pronouncement by the United 
State Army in Europe that none of its major units had met their 
operational training readiness conditions for the second straight 
year.22
Within the United States the situation was even worse:
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In June of 1968 the Joint Chiefs of Staff were forced to flunk every 
division and brigade on the continent with the lowest grading 
possible in all categories—including personnel training and 
logistics, with the exception of the 82nd Airborne Division which 
had a brigade in Vietnam.23
Within Vietnam the morale and disciplinary crisis was the most 
severe of all and sapped the Army’s ability to fight. The most extreme and 
tragic manifestation of the collapse of the Army was fragging, an attack 
against a sergeant or commander with a fragmentation grenade. According 
to the Army’s own statistics there were 551 fragging incidents in the 
years 1969-1972, resulting in 86 deaths and over 700 injuries. Eighty 
percent of the victims in these incidents were officers and NCOs.24 These 
statistics do not tell the full story of the internal rebellion within the 
Army, since they do not include shootings with fireamis, which were also 
common. By 1969 the Anny was at war with itself. Gung-ho officers 
eager to push their men into battle were an endangered species and often 
became the victims of assault by their own men. Shelby Stanton 
confirms what had been a widely circulated rumor at the time: following 
the bloody ten day battle for Hamburger Hill in May 1969, soldiers put 
a notice in an underground newspaper offering a $10,000 reward for 
fragging the officers in charge.25
The ultimate impact of the spreading internal breakdown was 
that soldiers increasingly refused to fight. By 1969 combat refusals and 
mutinies occurred with shocking frequency. One example during 1969 
involved A Company of the First Battalion/506th Regiment at Camp 
Evans near the A  Shau Valley. After a night of racial tensions that almost 
resulted in a shoot-out between black and white soldiers, fifteen black 
soldiers refused to report for combat patrol the next day.26 Numerous 
such incidents occurred throughout Vietnam. During research for 
Soldier’s Revolt, we were able to identify ten major incidents of combat 
refusal. Stanton’s study, drawing upon official Army unit archives, 
shows that the “ugly stain of combat disobedience” had reached epidemic 
proportions. In the elite First Cavalry Division alone, according to 
Stanton, there were thirty-five incidents of refusal to fight during 1970, 
some involving entire units.27
One of the most severe rebellions of the Vietnam era occurred in 
1968 among black inmates at the Long Binh jail, known to the troops as 
LBJ. As was common throughout the military at the time, LEkJ was 
oppressive and overcrowded, and many of the prisoners were black. 
Tensions and violence within the jail steadily rose until it exploded at the 
end ofAugust in a rebellion that left much of the stockade destroyed and 
resulted in injuries to 63 soldiers, including 23 who required 
hospitalization. One GI, Pvt. Edward Haskett of St. Petersburg, Florida, 
was killed in the uprising. Afterwards, nearly 200 blacks banded 
together and staged a work strike. A small group barricaded themselves 
within the stockade and continued to hold out for more than a month.28
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A similar rebellion occurred two weeks earlier at the Marine brig 
in Da Nang. The prisoners seized control of the central compound area 
and held out against armed guards for twenty hours. When commanders 
tried to remove some of the inmates a few days later, violence erupted 
again and a force of 120 riot-equipped MPs was required to restore order. 
Eight soldiers were injured in the incident, and the cell block was heavily 
damaged by fire.29
As elsewhere in the military, blacks in Vietnam formed solidarity 
grou ps and rap clubs that often became the centers of political resistance. 
One such group, the so-called “Black Liberation Front of the Armed 
Forces,” was lead by Eddie Burney, a Black Panther Party supporter 
stationed at the 4th Transportation Command in Long Binh. In the 
spring of 1971, Burney and other blacks staged a demonstration at Long 
Minh to commemorate the death of Martin Luther King, Jr. Chanting 
“Free Angela Davis!” and “Free the Brothers in LBJ!” forty GIs participated 
in the action.30 Similar groups appeared at other camps in Vietnam, as 
black GIs banded together to oppose the war and defend themselves 
against harassment and discrimination. Their resistance activities had 
an enormous impact on the American military and played a crucial role 
in speeding the end of the war.
As noted earlier, the GI movement spread from the Army and 
Marine Corps to the Air Force and Navy as the latter services assumed 
the principal burden of continuing the American war effort. The 
rebellion that nearly crippled the Army and Marine Corps began to 
disrupt operations in the Air Force and Navy as well. By 1972, resistance 
had reached the point where B-52 crews were refusing to fly and the 
Navy’s aircraft carriers were crippled by sabotage and internal rebellion.
As in the Army and Marine Corps, black servicemen played a 
leading role in the GI movement within the Air Force. Faced wilh the 
usual injustices—unequal job assignment, a disproportionate number 
of disciplinary punishments, slow promotions—black airmen joined 
together to defend their interests. As elsewhere in the military, they 
formed discussion groups or cultural organizations. At the end of 1970, 
Air Force Times admitted the existence of twenty-five such groups, many 
of them actively engaged in local struggles against injustice.31 One such 
group, affiliated with the American Servicemen’s Union, was the Black 
Discussion Group, active during 1971 at Plattsburgh Air Force Base in 
New York. Another was Concerned Black Airmen, centered at Chanute 
Air Force Base in Illinois. In 1971, the Chanute group held an on-base 
service on Armed Forces Day, May 17, dedicated to the memory ol 
Malcolm X. In August, after months of worsening racial tensions on the 
base and growing black frustration, Chanute erupted into violence. 
During a three-day period, the base exchange, theater, and gas station 
were damaged and several airmen were injured. A  few weeks later eighty 
men participated in a demonstration and picket line outside a high level 
meeting of the Air Training Command, to press home their demands for 
equal treatment.32
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There were other uprisings and militant actions at air bases 
during the war, but the largest and most dramatic occurred at Travis Air 
Force Base in May, 1971. Travis was a crucial center for the American 
war effort, and the primary embarkation point for flights to Indochina. 
From May 22 through May 25, this important California base was 
crippled by perhaps the largest mass rebellion in the history of the Air 
Force. The roots of the conflict lay in command repression, rampant 
discrimination against black airmen, and a general crisis in morale 
resulting from the increasing unpopularity of the war. The rebellion 
began with a fracas at the local enlisted men’s club, and quickly 
broadened into a generalized uprising throughout the base. Fighting 
apparently began on Saturday afternoon between black enlistees and 
the base security police. Following the incident, the minority barracks 
area was cordoned off and a number of black airmen were arrested. 
Anger and resentment continued to mount and on Monday evening the 
base erupted in violence as more than two hundred enlisted people, 
some whites included, attempted to free the imprisoned blacks and were 
met by a force of three hundred MPs and nearly eighty civilian officers 
called in from surrounding communities. A  major brawl ensued that 
involved some six hundred airmen. The officers’ club was burned, 
several dozen people were injured, and 135 GIs (most of them black) were 
arrested. Fighting continued into the next day; armed guards patrolled 
the base and all incoming traffic was searched at the gate.33 For a few 
days, Travis was in a virtual state of siege, with base activities disrupted 
and nearly all attention devoted to restoring order.
In the wake of the 1971 Travis revolt, the Pentagon hurriedly 
dispatched special race relations advisors to the base in an attempt to 
prevent further violence. Throughout the Air Force (and in other services 
as well), racial harmony programs were established, including “human 
relations” councils and so-called equal opportunity officers, as a means 
of stemming the growing black rebellion. The new policies had little 
impact on the actual conditions of service and were designed mainly to 
channel grievances into controllable outlets. These programs did 
nothing to alter the systemic discrimination and injustice within the 
military, and they did not even address the problem of the continuing 
war in Indochina.
The GI movement in the Air Force continued to grow right up 
until the end of direct U.S. involvement in the war in 1973. By 1972, 
there were more than thirty active GI organizing projects and underground 
newspapers within the Air Force, not counting the substantial number 
of black discussion groups. With each new wave of bombing by the Nixon 
administration, protests and demonstrations erupted at bases throughout 
the world. During the massive escalation of bombing in response to the 
1972 Easter offensive, demonstrations and rallies occurred at dozens of 
air bases throughout the world— including Westover, Mountain Home, 
Kirtland, McGuire, Offutt, Travis and March Air Force Bases in the 
United States, andYokota, Misawa, and ClarkAirForce Bases in Asia.34
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The rising tide of antiwar resistance ultimately began to disrupt 
bombing operations and reached even the predominantly white officer 
pilots. Morale among airmen and crew members at the combat bases in 
Thailand and Guam steadily plummeted in 1972, as evidenced by rising 
heroin use and increasing incidents of “fodding” or “foreign object 
damage”—a phrase used to describe the unknown source of damage to 
aircraft. In December, two pilots stationed in Thailand (Captains Dwight 
D. Evans and Michael Heck) refused to fly further combat missions.35 In 
the spring of 1973, four B-52 crewmen stationed at Guam joined in a 
federal court suit filed in New York by Congresswoman Elizabeth 
Holtzman, challenging the constitutionality of the continued bombing.36 
Shortly thereafter the Pentagon cut back on bombing missions, and a 
few months later Congress finally cut off funding and brought to an end 
the most intensive bombing campaign in the history of warfare.
Black resistance in the Navy also increased dramatically as its 
giant aircraft carrier task groups assumed increased responsibility for 
carrying on the air war. The Navy had traditionally been the most racist 
of the military services. It was the last to desegregate, and it has had a 
long tradition of exploiting Filipinos as servants and cooks. In 1971, 
fewer than five percent of the Navy’s sailors were black, and the 
percentage of blacks among officers was less than one percent. The 
expanding manpower needs of the Vietnam war, though, forced the Navy 
to open its doors to an increasing number of black recruits. While the 
number of blacks grew, the discriminatory traditions of the past remained. 
The result was widespread resistance and political dissent, with black 
sailors playing a leading role in the GI movement within the Navy.
By 1970 underground newspapers and protest actions began to 
appear at major naval bases and even aboard ships. One of the earliest 
manifestations of this development was the Movement for a Democratic 
Military (MDM), a network of loosely connected radical groups that 
appeared at San Diego, Long Beach, and Alameda in California, and at 
the Navy’s Great Lakes Naval Training Center near Chicago. The Great 
Lakes MDM chapter included a considerable number of black sailors, 
and in July, 1970, blacks and whites staged a series of protest marches 
and demonstrations in an attempt to free four WAVES they felt were 
unjustly imprisoned in the base brig.37
As the pace of Naval air operations off the Indochina coast 
intensified in 1971 and 1972, the level of antiwar opposition also grew. 
As aircraft carriers left their California ports for combat missions in the 
South China Sea, they were greeted not by the traditional cheering 
crowds, but with protest demonstrations and political opposition. In 
October, 1971, sailors and antiwar civilians in San Diego organized an 
informal election to decide whether the U.S.S. Constitution should sail for 
Vietnam. Fifty-four thousand San Diegans voted in an unofficial 
referendum, including 6,900 active duty servicemen and women. Eighty- 
two percent of the civilians and 73 percent of the servicepeople voted to 
keep the Connie home.38 The ship eventually departed for Indochina, but
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it sailed under a cloud of dissent. A  similar movement, initiated entirely 
by active duty sailors, emerged at the same time aboard the carrier U.S.S. 
Coral Sea at Alameda. Twelve hundred sailors— one fourth of the entire 
crew—signed a petition opposing the war in Indochina and urging that 
the ship stay home.39 A  similar below decks movement emerged in 
opposition to the sailing of the U.S.S. Kitty Hawk a few months later. 
When each of these ships sailed, a small group of black and white sailors 
on board declared that they could not in conscience participate in the 
war and publicly refused to go.
The Nixon administration’s response to the Easter offensive in 
1972 placed even greater pressures on an already heavily committed 
Navy. During the rest of that year as many as four carrier task groups 
(out of a total of fourteen) were on combat station in the Gulf of Tonkin. 
Normal fleet operations were completely disrupted, as practically the 
entire Pacific fleet was thrown into the fray. For the already overworked 
crew members involved, the escalation created great hardships. With 
opposition to the war spreading rapidly, morale plummeted. While many 
sailors expressed their opposition through acts of political dissent, many 
others resorted to more extreme measures of disobedience and 
obstruction.
Perhaps the most shocking manifestation of the disintegration of 
morale within the Navy in 1972 was the growing prevalence of internal 
sabotage. In its 1973 report on Navy disciplinary problems, the House 
Armed Sendees Committee disclosed what it termed “an alarming 
frequency of successful acts of sabotage and apparent sabotage on a 
wide variety of ships and stations.” 40 The Committee reported “literally 
hundreds of instances of damage to Naval property wherein sabotage is 
suspected.”41 The most dramatic and important of these internal acts of 
disruption occurred in July, 1972, when within the space of just three 
weeks, two of the Navy’s aircraft carriers were put out of commission by 
attacks from within. On July 10, 1972, a massive fire broke out aboard 
the U.S.S. Forrestalin Norfolk. The blaze caused seven million dollars in 
damage and was described as the largest single act of sabotage in Naval 
history. The carrier’s deployment was delayed by more than two 
months.42 Three weeks later another act of sabotage crippled the carrier 
U.S.S. Ranger as it was about to depart from Alameda for Indochina. A  
paint scraper and two twelve-inch bolts were inserted into the ship’s 
reduction gears, causing nearly one million dollars in damage and 
forcing a three-and-a-half month delay in operations for extensive 
repairs.43
The sabotaging of the Ranger and Forrestal set the stage for one 
of the most violent internal uprisings in the history of the Navy—the 
rebellion aboard the U.S.S. Kitty Hawk. In October, 1972, after a 
grueling eight months at sea and constant bombing missions in the Gulf 
of Tonkin, the huge ship pulled into Subic Bay in the Philippines for a 
rest stop before a scheduled return home. Unexpectedly, the crew was 
informed that rather than sailing home, they had to return to combat
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operations in the South China Sea. According to the report on the 
incident by the House Armed Services Committee, “this rescheduling 
apparently was due to the incidents of sabotage aboard her sister ships 
U.S.S. Ranger and U.S.S. Forrestal.”44 With two of the Navy’s principal 
carriers out of commission due to sabotage, the Kilty Hawk was forced 
to cancel its return home. With tensions already high among crew 
members due to declining morale and rising racial tensions, the order to 
return to Vietnam was the spark that touched off violence. On the night 
before the ship’s departure, serious fighting erupted at the Subic Bay 
enlisted men’s club. On the evening of October 12, as the ship arrived 
at Yankee Station off the coast of Indochina, the ship’s intelligence 
investigator exacerbated tensions by calling in only black sailors for 
questioning about the brawl at Subic. Outraged at what they considered 
unfair treatment, over one hundred blacks gathered for a meeting on the 
ship’s aft mess deck at approximately 8pm. The armed Marine detachment 
aboard the earner was summoned to suppress the meeting, and an 
explosive situation quickly developed. The Executive Officer (XO), 
Commander Benjamin Cloud (a black man), entered the area and 
attempted to restore calm by ordering the blacks and Marines to 
separate ends of the ship. Moments later, however, Captain Marland 
Townsends, the Commanding Officer (CO), arrived and issued conflicting 
orders. As confusion spread, the blacks and armed Marines encountered 
each other unexpectedly on the hanger deck and a bitter clash erupted. 
The fighting spread rapidly throughout the ship, with bands of blacks 
and whites marauding through the decks and attacking each other with 
fists, chains, wrenches, and pipes. For hours the ship seethed with 
violent conflict and confusion. At one point the XO believed that the CO 
had been injured or killed, and made an announcement over the public 
address system ordering the rebels and armed Marines to separate 
locations. The Commander, still on the hanger deck and distressed at 
the XO’s announcement, gave different orders over the address system. 
Finally, at about 2:30am at a meeting in the forecastle, the black sailors 
agreed to lay down their chains and other weapons and disperse. A total 
of forty-seven men, most of them black, were treated for injuries that 
night. Three had to be evacuated to shore hospitals. All twenty-five 
sailors arrested for the incident were black.45
A few weeks later, another major rebellion— this time nonviolent— 
occurred aboard the aircraft carrier U.S.S. Constellation in San Diego. 
Described by the New York Times as “the first mass mutiny in the history 
of the U.S. Navy,”45 the rebellion aboard the Constellation grew out of the 
effort s of an onboard organization known as The Black Fraction to resist 
repression and discrimination against black crew members. Throughout 
Oct ober, 1972, the black sailors organized committ ees among themselves, 
elected representatives and demanded investigations into the ship’s 
records of non-judicial punishment. As the organization grew in 
strength, the ship’s commanders singled out fifteen members as agitators 
and ordered that six of them be given immediate less-than-honorable
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discharges. Rumors began to circulate that as many as two hundred 
blacks would receive bad discharges. In response, more than one 
hundred sailors—mostly black, but including a few whites— staged a sit- 
in in the aft mess deck on November 3, 1972. The sailors continued their 
protest action throughout the day and into the next morning, refusing 
a direct order to report for muster. To avert violence and another Kitty 
Hawk incident, the ship’s captain decided to return to North Island in 
San Diego and put the dissident group ashore as a “beach detachment.” 
More than 130 men, most of them black, went ashore. A  few days later, 
on November 8th, the commander ordered the men to return to the 
Constellation. The sailors refused and instead mustered in their own 
formation on the pier, in effect staging a dockside strike. A  total of 122 
crewmen were involved in the action. Despite their direct refusal of an 
order, the rebels received light treatment. Commanders were apparently 
eager to prevent, at all costs, further violence or uprisings. A number of 
the rebels were quietly discharged, but most were simply reassigned to 
shore duty.47
In the wake of the Kitiy Hawk and the Constellation incidents, 
Admiral Elmo Zumwalt, Chief of Naval Operations, called together eighty 
leading admirals and Marine Corps generals for an emergency meeting 
at the Pentagon in order to address the problem of race relations. The 
assembled commanders were urged to be more sensitive to the growing 
number of blacks within the military and to give greater attention to the 
human relations councils and other reforms recently introduced by the 
Pentagon.4” In some places commanders sponsored educational programs 
on black history and culture, and sensitivity sessions and discussion 
groups were allowed. As noted earlier, these attempts at reform did 
nothing to redress the structural injustices and systematic discrimination 
encountered by blacks within the military. Moreover, as long as the war 
in Vietnam continued and American troops remained in Indochina, the 
GI movement and the black rebellion within the military continued. Only 
in 1973, as the direct U.S. combat role finally came to an end, did 
tensions within the ranks begin to ease and military life slowly return to 
normal.
As Anerican forces completed their withdrawal from Indochina 
and the military shifted to the all-volunteer force, hundreds of thousands 
of Vietnam-era GIs were discharged en masse. Manpower levels in the 
military dropped sharply from a high of 3.5 million in 1968 to 2.3 million 
in 1972. In some cases, an “early out” release program allowed enlisted 
people to return home months ahead of schedule. Many of the black 
resisters in the Navy were released under this program in 1972; the same 
strategy was used to rid the Army of soldier activists the year before. The 
longest and most divisive war in American history was at last over, and 
the GIs who resisted it were sent home. Military commanders breathed 
a collective sigh of relief and began the arduous task of rebuilding their 
shattered services and creating a new all-volunteer force.
Although little known or understood, the GI resistance movement
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in which blacks played a leading role was an important part of the 
Vietnam war experience. Never before in modern history had the 
American armed forced faced such widespread internal revolt. Hundreds 
of thousands of soldiers, marines, airmen and sailors dissented and 
disobeyed military commanders, often at grave personal risk, to speak 
out for peace and justice. Their struggle had a major impact in forcing 
the American military to finally end the war in Vietnam.
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